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This paper reports laboratory experiments investigating behavior when players may make
inferences about the intentions behind others’ prior actions based on higher- or lower-accuracy
information about those actions. We investigate a trust game with first mover trembling, a game
in which nature determines whether the first mover’s decision is implemented or reversed. The
results indicate that second movers give first movers the benefit of the doubt. However, first
movers do not anticipate this response. Ultimately, it appears that subjects are thinking on at
least three levels when making decisions: they are concerned with their own material well being,
the trustworthiness of their counterpart, and how their own actions will be perceived.

1. Introduction
It is well established that individuals in laboratory games do not always pursue their own
maximum monetary payoff. In the ultimatum game, materially self-interested second movers
should accept any positive payoff and thus materially self-interested first movers should offer the
smallest possible positive amount (or zero). However, more equal splits are frequently proposed
and positive offers are often rejected.1 In an attempt to understand such behavior researchers
hypothesize that subjects may attribute intentions to actions.2 For example, a minimal proposal
might be considered greedy by a second mover, thus prompting rejection as a form of
punishment. A first mover may avoid making a minimal proposal in order to try to avoid
rejection, or because of altruistic preferences, or both.
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) introduced the investment game, which unlike the
ultimatum game has a mutually-beneficial, cooperative outcome. In the investment game and
the related trust game described below, a first mover can forgo a certain payoff in favor of a
larger total payoff that will be allocated by a paired second mover. While material self-interest
predicts that the second mover will keep everything, and thus the first mover should not forgo
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the certain payoff, more cooperative behavior is frequently observed. Berg, et al. found that 28
of 32 first movers sent more than the minimum positive amount of money and 11 of the 28
paired second movers returned a greater amount than was received. This led Berg, et al. to
conclude that cooperation was a “primitive” aspect of behavior. Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and
Boeing (2000) among many others find the behavioral pattern to be robust to various treatments.
However, Cox and Deck (2005) find that the level of social distance in the experiment protocol
can affect second mover behavior in the trust game.3 Similarly, in ultimatum games negative
reciprocity or punishment is found to be dependent upon the context in which the game is
played.4
This literature suggests that choices made by individuals depend in part on the perceived
intentions of other players and how people expect their decisions to be interpreted.5 Generous
actions by the first mover in the investment game are often interpreted as trusting while the
second movers’ sharing the larger total payoff is often interpreted as positive reciprocity.
However, to directly examine the significance of motives one needs to verify that behavior
differs for the same nominal payoff decision in different circumstances. To accomplish this one
can decompose a game into a series of related games, some with and some without the
hypothesized motivation (see Cox 2004).6 For example Cox and Deck (2005, 2006) examine the
trust game and the associated dictator game in which the decision maker faces the same nominal
choices as the second mover in the trust game, as shown in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, the numbers at the end of a branch are the dollar payoffs. In the trust game
tree, the top (bottom) number is the first (second) mover’s payoff. In the dictator game tree, the
bottom (top) is the dictator's (other subject’s) payoff. The number at the middle of each branch
is the number of subjects who made that choice. Note that 8 of 24 ( ≅ 33% ) of the dictators
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chose "cooperate" in the dictator game and 21 of 33 ( ≅ 64% ) of the second movers chose
"cooperate" in the trust game. Together, data from the trust and dictator games support the
conclusion that there is significant play motivated by positive reciprocity in the trust game.
McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003) find essentially the same pattern in a similar design in which
first movers were required to play down (“choose” trust) in the involuntary trust game (see
Figure 2).
It is clear from previous research that perceived intentions can affect behavior.7 Data
reported by Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) in a variation of the trust game framed as a contract
demonstrates a similar pattern. In their game the decision to defect by a second mover, i.e. not
perform according to the contract, is followed by a node at which with some probability nature,
i.e. the “legal system,” would detect defection and enforce the cooperative outcome minus a
penalty for the second mover. While the findings are based upon repeated play environments,
the general result is that for both small and large probabilities of a second mover being penalized
for defection there is considerable cooperation (75% and 86% respectively), but this is not true
for the intermediate case (30% cooperation).8 In the low detection case one would expect at least
as much cooperation as in the trust game given the repeated nature of the experiment and in fact
it was. In the high probability case, everyone regardless of their level of self-interest should
cooperate and most did. However, the intermediate case is basically a dictator control treatment
in that the first mover’s decision is not a signal of trust because the legal system is sufficiently
developed that a risk-neutral, self-interested first mover would not choose to exit. Thus one
would expect behavior similar to a dictator game which it was.
In all of the experiments discussed above subjects had complete information about the
payoffs of all players and there was no uncertainty about what actions were selected.9 However,
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in many naturally occurring situations players do not have such complete information. At one
extreme where players know only their own payoffs from each possible outcome, McCabe,
Rassenti and Smith (1998) find that behavior closely matches the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium prediction for fully rational, exclusively self-interested agents. Of course, in that
setting it is not clear how to interpret the motivations or intentions of the other players.
Our paper takes a complementary approach in which subjects have complete information
about payoffs but there is uncertainty about what actions have been selected by others. That is,
we ask whether people are willing to give others the benefit of the doubt. To explore this issue
we consider a version of the trust game, referred to as the trembling game, where there is an
exogenously determined chance that the first mover’s decision is reversed. When a second
mover is called upon to make a decision in the trembling game there is some probability that the
first mover did not actually trust the second mover. It is our hypothesis that people who would
select cooperate in the dictator game control treatment would do so in the trembling game as
well.10 Similarly, we hypothesize that those who would select defect in the trust game would also
select defect in the trembling game.11 Hence we expect this type of uncertainty to affect only
those motivated by reciprocity, and therefore the percentage of people cooperating in the
trembling game should be at least as great as in the dictator game but no greater than in the trust
game. This approach allows us to identify how unambiguous the connection between the
decision task and the perceived intention behind another’s action leading to that task has to be in
order to induce reciprocity.

2. Experimental Design
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One hundred and twenty subjects played the trust game shown in Figure 1, with a 25%
chance that the first mover’s action would be reversed. Subjects were recruited from
undergraduate classes and were paid a $5 show up fee in addition to the payment determined by
the outcome of the one shot game. Each subject participated in only one session and had not
previously participated in any similar "fairness" experiments in our laboratory. The experiment
procedures followed identically those of Cox and Deck (2005) except that a sheet of additional
directions was distributed to each participant.12 This sheet read as follows.
Additional Directions:
Once a decision-maker 1 has made a decision by clicking on a branch and pressing send,
that decision-maker 1 will be prompted by the computer to pick a number between 1 and
4 including 1 and 4. After all decision-maker 1s have selected a number, the
experimenter will randomly draw a ball from a bingo cage. If the number the
experimenter draws does not match the number decision-maker 1 selected, then decisionmaker 1’s decision will remain unchanged. However, if the number drawn by the
experimenter is the same as the number selected by decision-maker 1, then decisionmaker 1’s choice will be reversed by the computer. Decision-maker 2 will never know
the number selected by the decision-maker 1 counterpart.

After these additional directions were read aloud, subjects were able to ask questions
about this procedure. Also, the bingo cage and the numbered balls were shown to the subjects,
and there was a trial drawing with explanation. Thus, a second mover knew that if her paired
first mover chose “trust” there was a 75% chance it would not be reversed and if her counterpart
chose “exit” there was a 25% chance that it would be reversed.
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If second movers give first movers the benefit of the doubt, behavior should be the same
as in the regular trust game (64% cooperation). If, on the other hand, imputation of intentions
has to be certain to generate reciprocal behavior, one would find less cooperation than in the
regular trust game. If reciprocity is fragile then behavior in the (trust game with) trembling
treatment would be similar to behavior in the dictator control treatment (33% cooperation).
However, an obvious difference between the trembling treatment and the dictator treatment is the
possibility of both players receiving $10. Based on previous work, such a difference could affect
second mover behavior.13 Therefore, we conducted another control treatment in which the move
at the first node was determined randomly, by the flip of a coin. Following the same procedures,
sixty-four additional inexperienced subjects were recruited. For this treatment the sheet of
additional directions read as follows.
Additional Directions:
A Decision Maker 1 has no decision to make. The branch selected at the Decision Maker
1 node will be determined by a coin flip. Decision Maker 1’s will leave this room, before
the coin is flipped, and return to the sign-in room.

After these additional directions were read aloud, subjects were able to ask questions about this
procedure and were given the opportunity to inspect the coin. At this point the first movers
returned to the show up room and then everyone was shown the decision tree for the trust game
in Figure 1 and told which branch would be selected by heads or tails.14

3. Results
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The data from the experiments are presented in Table 1 along with the data from Cox and
Deck (2005, 2006) for comparison. Two findings are readily apparent from the table. First,
behavior of second movers is virtually identical in the coin flip and dictator treatments. One
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two proportions are the same given the p-value of 0.908
for the two-sided z-test.15 Given that the two treatments generate the same behavior, subsequent
analysis combines the data from these two treatments. This finding is yet more evidence of the
robustness of behavior in dictator games. Recall that 33% to 35% of subjects being cooperative
was also reported by Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) and McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003) for
their similar treatments discussed above.
The second finding is that as hypothesized the cooperation rate in the trembling treatment
nominally falls between the cooperation rates in the regular trust game and the dictator/coin flip
treatments. Of the 20 second movers in the trembling game who had an opportunity to choose,
11 (or 55%) chose cooperate. This is significantly more cooperation than the 15 of 44 (or 34%)
who cooperated in the dictator/coin flip games (p-value of 0.057 in the one-tailed z-test of equal
proportions against the one-sided alternative).16 In contrast, the difference in cooperation
between the trust and trembling games is not significant (p-value of 0.267 in the one-tailed z-test
of equal proportions against the one-sided alternative).17 This suggests that while there is some
nominal slippage in cooperation, reciprocal behavior is not fragile in this context. That is, people
who are conditional cooperators are willing to give others the benefit of the doubt by acting as
though others have behaved in a manner warranting cooperation even if there is no certain
evidence of that behavior.
A third finding is that even though second movers do not significantly change their
behavior with the introduction of trembling, first movers do. In the trembling game only 20 of
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59 (or 34% of) first movers selected trust.18 This is significantly different from the 33 of 66 (or
50%) selecting trust in the regular version of the trust game (with a p-value of 0.069 in a twotailed test).19 That first movers are divided approximately equally between the two options is a
fairly robust finding. For example, McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) report that 17 of 27 first
movers trusted, behavior not significantly different from 50%. Previous studies have not found a
treatment effect for first movers. For example, Cox and Deck (2005) find that switching from a
low social distance protocol where subjects are paid in person to a high social distance protocol
where payoffs are double blind leads to a significant decrease in cooperation but no
corresponding decrease in trust.20
The implication of behavior in the trembling game is that first movers seem to expect
second movers to respond to the uncertainty by not giving the first movers the benefit of the
doubt. Consider the decision faced by first mover j in the trust game. Suppose she believes that
the second mover will select cooperate with probability p j . If she picks exit her utility will be
u j (10,10) while the choice of trust will result in an expected utility of
p j u j (15,25) + (1 − p j )u j (0,40) . Normalizing so that u j (0,40) = 0 , individual j will choose trust in

the trust game if p j > u j (10,10) / u j (15,25) . For a materially self-interested, risk-neutral person this
simplifies to p j > 10 / 15 = 66% , which is close to the 63.6% percent cooperation rate observed in
the trust game. Now consider the decision faced by first mover j in the trembling game.
Suppose that she believes the second mover will select cooperate with probability π j if given the
opportunity. Then if she picks exit her expected utility will be
0.75u j (10,10) + 0.25[π j u j (15,25) + (1 − π j )u j (0,40)] while the choice of trust will result in an

expected utility of 0.75[π j u j (15,25) + (1 − π j )u j (0,40)] + 0.25u j (10,10) . Again normalizing so that
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u j (0,40) = 0 , we find that individual j will choose trust in the trembling game if

π j > u j (10,10) / u j (15,25) . Thus first movers are predicted to be more or less trusting in the trust
game than in the trembling game depending only on their expectations ( p j or π j ) for second
mover behavior in the two games.
While the observed cooperation rate in the trembling game of 55% is not significantly
lower than the cooperation rate of 63.6% in the trust game, it is nominally lower. The
significantly lower occurrence of the trust branch choice in the trembling game may be a
reflection of the lower nominal rate of cooperation in that game, but it may instead be an addition
to the growing literature on backwards induction failure in which first movers fail to correctly
anticipate the subsequent behavior of second movers (Camerer, 2003).

4. Conclusion

Often, when people make decisions they have imperfect information about the intentions
behind another’s perceived action and therefore have to make inferences from what they observe.
To explore the ramifications of this type of uncertainty in a controlled laboratory setting we
introduce trembling into the trust game. In this variant of the game, there is a 25% chance that
the first mover’s action will be reversed. This design allows us to address two important aspects
of economic behavior. How do people behave when they have to consider how the results of
their imperfectly-observable actions will be perceived rather than how their actual actions would
be perceived if they were perfectly observable? How do people react when an observed action
may or may not have been intentional?
In response to the second question, we find that second movers are willing to give the
first mover’s the benefit of the doubt. Behavior for second movers is approximately the same in
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the trembling game as in the standard trust game, with a majority of the second movers who are
given the opportunity to make a decision deciding to cooperate. Further, it is clear that second
movers are considering the intentions of the first movers. When the first mover decision is
determined randomly by the flip of a coin, the cooperation rate falls to one-third. This is
approximately the same cooperation rate observed in the dictator control treatment for the trust
game as well as similar treatments reported by Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) and McCabe,
Rigdon, and Smith (2003).
Even though second movers are willing to give the benefit of the doubt, the answer to the
first question is that first movers do not anticipate this, as evidenced by the significant decrease
in trust resulting from the introduction of trembling. This does not necessarily mean that first
movers expect a large shift in second mover behavior. In the trust game a risk neutral materially
self-interested first mover is basically indifferent between trusting and exiting given the observed
behavior of second movers. Thus any reduction in anticipated cooperation could lead these first
movers to strictly prefer not trusting. Of course subjects with altruistic preferences or ones that
misperceives the risk of defection may continue to choose trust in the trembling treatment.
Ultimately, the impact of first movers anticipating less cooperation is that substantially fewer
pairs reach the cooperative outcome.
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1

2

See Güth and Tietz (1990) for a survey of experimental results in ultimatum games.
An alternative approach is to model utility as depending upon the monetary outcomes of

multiple players; see for example Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
However, these models have had only limited success; see Deck (2001), Engelmann and Strobel
(2004), and Cox and Sadiraj (2005).
3

Specifically, Cox and Deck (2005) find that second mover behavior is less cooperative when

the experimenter does not know the identity of the subjects than when subjects receive their
payoffs in person from the experimenters.
4

Responses to greedy proposals in ultimatum and mini-ultimatum games have been found to

depend on the decision context and payoff structure (see Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith
1994 and Cox and Deck 2005).
5

See McCabe, Smith and LePore (2000) for a general discussion of intentions and “mind

reading.”
6

Alternately, one can make comparisons by presenting a subject with a collection of similar

games and observing how choices vary with the games’ payoff structures (see Falk, Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2003; Güth, Huck and Müller, 2000).
7

As noted by McCabe, Rigdon and Smith, this demonstrates a critical shortcoming in purely

outcome-based models such as offered by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt
(1999).
8

This discussion is based upon data from the last period in which different treatments involved

different probabilities of detection and omits the session with fixed subject matching as those
subjects knew they would continue to interact with each other in subsequent rounds.
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9

Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) create uncertainty about the outcome for a given action by

introducing a lottery, but there is no uncertainty about what action was undertaken.
10

As discussed in the next section, there is an alternative specification for a game that one could

argue is a more appropriate baseline than the dictator game. As revealed in section 3, behavior
in the dictator game and the alternative specification is indistinguishable.
11

A referee suggested an alternative hypothesis: a second mover may feel bad that a first

mover’s decision could be reversed and this could make the second mover more likely to
cooperate.
12

A copy of all directions and handouts used in this study are available from the authors upon

request.
13

For example, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) find that payoffs along other branches of the

game tree can impact behavior.
14

In half the sessions heads corresponded to the exit branch and in the other half heads

corresponded to the trust branch. The terms trust, exit, cooperate, and defect were never used in
interactions with the subjects, instead neutral language was used throughout. Participants were
referred to as decision makers and not players or movers.
15

In the case of comparing two sample proportions, a z-test gives the same p-value as a

2

test.

Here we use a two-sided test because we have no prior belief about how behavior may differ
between these two treatments
16

A one-tailed test is used for second mover behavior because previous research suggests a

direction for the treatment effect as discussed in the introduction. The treatment effect would not
be significant based upon a two-tailed test.
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17

The treatment effect would not be significant based on a two-tailed test either.

18

The response from one subject in the role of a first mover was omitted from the analysis

because that subject had previously participated in a trust game experiment. Including this
observation would not change the substantive conclusions drawn in the paper.
19

In this case previous work does not suggest a specific direction for the alternative hypothesis

and thus the question of interest is simply if there is a difference.
20

Ortmann, Fitzgerald and Boeing (2000) find a lack of treatment effect on first mover behavior

in a study of the investment game.
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Table 1. Observed Behavior in the Four Games
Game

Trust

Trembling

Coin Flip

Dictator

21

11

7

8

12

9

13

16

63.6%

55%

35%

33.3%

Number
Selecting
Cooperate
Number
Selecting
Defect
Cooperation
Percentage

17

Figure 1. Frequency of Actions Chosen in Cox and Deck (2005, 2006)
Figure 2. Frequency of Actions Chosen in McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003)
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1

Exit

33

Trust

⎛10 ⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝10 ⎠

33
2

Cooperate

21

Defect

12

⎛ 15 ⎞
⎜⎜ 25 ⎟⎟
⎝
⎠

2

Cooperate

8

Defect

16
⎛0⎞
⎜⎜ 40 ⎟⎟
⎝ ⎠

Trust Game

⎛0⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝ 40 ⎠

Dictator Game

19

⎛ 15
⎜⎜
⎝ 25

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

1

Exit

10

Trust

⎛ 20 ⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝ 20 ⎠

1

17
2
Defect

Cooperate

11

⎛ 25 ⎞
⎜⎜ 25 ⎟⎟
⎝
⎠

6

2

Cooperate

9

Defect

⎛ 25 ⎞
⎜⎜
⎟⎟
⎝ 25 ⎠

18
⎛ 15 ⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝ 30 ⎠

Voluntary Trust Game

⎛ 15 ⎞
⎜⎜ ⎟⎟
⎝ 30 ⎠

Involuntary Trust Game
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